in the textbooks for years. Someone who comes up with a bright idea is not necessarily less creative just because someone else had it before them. Indeed, if the person who had it first was Shakespeare, or Euclid, we'dthink evenmore highly of the achievement.
Suppose a twelve-year old girl, who'dn ev err ead Macbeth, compared the healing power of sleep with someone knitting up a ravelled sleeve.W ould you refuse to say she was creative,just because the Bard said it first? Perhaps, if you'db een talking around the topic with her, encouraging her to come up with non-literal ways of speaking, and evenp utting one or more of the three key ideas into the conversation. Otherwise, you'dhav e to acknowledge her remark as a truly imaginative one.
What you might do, and what I think you should do in this situation, is to makead istinction between "psychological" creativity and "historical" creativity.( P-creativity and H-creativity,f or short.) P-creativity involves coming up with a surprising, valuable idea that'sn ew to the person who comes up with it. It doesn'tmatter howmanypeople have had that idea before. But if a new idea is H-creative,that means that (so far as we know) no-one else has had it before: it has arisen for the first time in human history.
Clearly,H -creativity is a special case of P-creativity.F or historians of art, science, and technology --and for encyclopaedia users, too --H-creativity is what'si mportant. And in daily life, we appreciate it too: it really isn'tt rue that "The old jokes are the best ones". But for someone who is trying to understand the psychology of creativity,i t'sP -creativity that'sc rucial. Nevermind who thought of the idea first: howdid that person manage to come up with it, given that they had neverthought of it before? If "new,"i nthis context, has twoimportantly different meanings, "surprising" has three.
An idea may be surprising because it'sunfamiliar,ore venunlikely --likea100-to-1 outsider winning the Derby.This sort of surprise goes against statistics.
The second sort of surprise is more interesting. An unexpected idea may "fit" into a style of thinking that you already had --but you're surprised because you hadn'tr ealized that this particular idea was part of it. Maybe you're evenintrigued to find that an idea of this general type fits into the familiar style.
And the third sort of surprise is more interesting still: this is the astonishment you feel on encountering an apparently impossible idea. It just couldn't have entered anyone'shead, you feel --and yet it did. It may evenengender other ideas which, yesterday,you'dhav e thought equally impossible. What on earth can be going on?
The Three Ways of Creativity "What is going on" isn'tm agic --and it'sd ifferent in each type of case. Forc reativity can happen in three main ways, which correspond to the three sorts of surprise.
The first involves making unfamiliar combinations of familiar ideas. Examples include poetic imagery,c ollage in painting or textile art, and analogies. These newc ombinations can be generated either deliberately or,often, unconsciously.Think of a physicist comparing an atom to the solar system, for instance, or a journalist comparing a politician with a decidedly non-cuddly animal. Or call to mind some examples of creative associations in poetry or visual art.
In all these cases, making --and also appreciating --the novelc ombination requires a rich store of knowledge in the person'smind, and manydifferent ways of moving around within it.
The journalist or newspaper-reader needs a host of concepts about both politics and animal behaviour,a nd some "personal" knowledge about the individual politician in question. Cartoonists who depict Ken Livingstone (the first publicly-elected Mayor of London) as a newt are tapping into manyd ifferent conceptual streams, including gossip about what he keeps in an aquarium in his home. The surprise you feel on looking at the cartoon is largely caused by seeing ahuman figure with a newt'screst and tail: a combination of ideas that'se venless probable than the outsider winning the Derby.
If the novelc ombination is to be valued by us, it has to have some point. It may or (more usually) may not have been caused by some random process --likeshaking marbles in a bag. But the ideas/marbles have toh av e some intelligible conceptual pathway between them for the combination to "makes ense." The newt-human makes sense for manyr easons, one of which is Ken'sfamed predilection for newts. (What are some of the others?) And (to return to the example from Macbeth) sleep is a healer,asknitting can be. Even if twoideas are put together randomly in the first place, which I suspect happens only rarely,theyare retained/valued only if some such links can be found.
The other twot ypes of creativity are interestingly different from the first. Theyi nv olvet he exploration, and in the most surprising cases the transformation, of conceptual spaces in people's minds.
Exploring Conceptual Spaces
Conceptual spaces are structured styles of thought. They're normally picked up from one'so wn culture or peer-group, but are occasionally borrowed from other cultures. In either case, they're already there: theyaren'toriginated by one individual mind. Theyinclude ways of writing prose or poetry; styles of sculpture, painting, or music; theories in chemistry or biology; fashions of couture or choreography, nouvel cuisine and good old meat-and-two-veg ... in short, any disciplined way of thinking that'sfamiliar to (and valued by) a certain social group.
Within a givenc onceptual space, manyt houghts are possible, only some of which may have been actually thought. Some spaces, of course, have a richer potential than others. Noughts-andcrosses is such a restricted style of game-playing that every possible move has already been made countless times. But that'snot true of chess, where the number of possible moves, though finite, is astronomically large. And if some sub-areas of chemistry have been exhausted (every possible molecule of that type having been identified), the space of possible limericks, or sonnets, has not --and neverwill be.
Whateverthe size of the space, someone who comes up with a newidea within that thinkingstyle is being creative int he second, exploratory,s ense. If the newi dea is surprising not just in itself but as an example of an unexpected general type, so much the better.A nd if it leads on to others (still within the same space) whose possibility was previously unsuspected, better still. Exploratory creativity is valuable because it can enable someone to see possibilities theyh adn't glimpsed before. Theymay evenstart to ask just what limits, and just what potential, this style of thinking has.
We can compare this with driving into the country,w ith an Ordnance Survey map that you consult occasionally.Y ou can keep to the motorways, and only look at the thick red lines on your map. But suppose, for some reason (a police-diversion, or a call of nature), you drive off onto a smaller road. When you set out, you didn'tevenknowitexisted. But of course, if you unfold the map you'll see it marked there. And perhaps you ask yourself "I wonder what'sr ound that corner?," and drive round it to find out. Maybe you come to a pretty village, or a council estate; or perhaps you end up in a cul-de-sac, or back on the motorway you came offi nt he first place. All these things were always possible (and they're all represented on the map). But you'dn ev er noticed them before --and you wouldn'thav e done so now, ifyou hadn'tgot into an exploratory frame of mind.
In exploratory creativity,t he "countryside" is a style of thinking. Instead of exploring a structured geographical space, you explore a structured conceptual space, mapped by a particular style of painting, perhaps, or a specific area of theoretical chemistry.
All professional artists and scientists do this sort of thing. Even the most mundane streetartists in Leicester Square produce newp ortraits, or newc aricatures, every day.T heya re exploring their space, though not necessarily in an adventurous way.O ccasionally,t heym ay realize that their sketching-style enables them to do something (convey the set of the head, or the hint of a smile) better than they'dbeen doing before. Theyadd a newtrick to their repertoire, but in a real sense it'ssomething that "fits" their established style: the potential was always there.
Transforming the Space
What the street-artist may also do is realize the limitations of their style. Then, theyh av e an opportunity which the Sunday driverdoes not. Give ortakeafew years, and ignoring earthquake and flood, the country roads are fixed. Certainly, you can'tc hange them. Your Ordnance Survey map is reliable not only because it'sright, but because it stays right. (Have you bothered to buy a newb ook of road-maps within the last fewy ears?) But the maps inside our heads, and favoured by our communities, can change --and it'screative thinking which changes them.
Some changes are relatively small and also relatively superficial. (Ask yourself: what'st he difference?) The limits of the mental map, or of some particular aspect of it, are slightly pushed, slightly altered, gently tweaked. Compare the situation in geographical space: suppose everyone in that pretty village suddenly added a roof-extension to their cottage. It may ruin the prettiness of the village, but it won'tchange the dimensions of the map. At most, the little "portrait" of the village (assuming that it's that sort of map) will have toberedrawn.
The street-artist, then --or Picasso, in a similar position --has an opportunity.Inprinciple, he (or,asalways, she) could do the psychological equivalent of adding roof extensions, or building anew road (a newtechnique, leading to newpossibilities), or evenre-routing the motorway.
Re-routing the motorway (in "real life" as in the mind) is the most difficult of all. The surprises that would engender could be so great as to makethe driverlose his bearings. He may wonder if he'sb een magically transported to a different county,o re venad ifferent country.M aybe he remembers a frustrating episode on his last trip, when he wanted to do something but his passenger scornfully said: "In England, motorways are like this: theys imply don'ta llowy ou to do that. Yo uwant to do it? Tough! It'simpossible." Agiv enstyle of thinking, no less than a road-system, can render certain thoughts impossible --which is to say,u nthinkable. The difference, as remarked above,i st hat thinking-styles can be changed --sometimes, in the twinkling of an eye.
Someone skilfully writing a limerick won'tfi nd iambic pentameters dropping from their pen. But if you want to write a news ort of limerick, or a non-limerick somehowg rounded in that familiar style, then maybe blank verse could play a role. The deepest cases of creativity involve someone'st hinking something which, with respect to the conceptual spaces in their minds, they couldn't have thought before. The supposedly impossible idea can come about only if the creator changes the pre-existing style in some way.Itmust be tweaked, or evenradically transformed, so that thoughts are nowp ossible which previously (within the untransformed space) were literally inconceivable. --But howcan that possibly happen?
Machine-Maps of the Mind
To understand howe xploratory or transformational creativity can happen, we must knoww hat conceptual spaces are, and what sorts of mental processes could explore and modify them.
Styles of thinking are studied by literary critics, musicologists, and historians of art, fashion, and science. And theya re appreciated by us all. But intuitive appreciation, and evenl ifelong scholarship, may not maket heir structure clear.( An architectural historian, for instance, said of Frank Lloyd Wright'sPrairie Houses that their "principle of unity" is "occult".) This is the first point where computers are relevant. Conceptual spaces, and ways of exploring and transforming them, can be described by concepts drawn from artificial intelligence (AI).
AI-concepts enable us to do psychology in a neww ay,b ya llowing us to construct (and test) hypotheses about the structures and processes that may be involved in thought. For instance, the structure of tonal harmony, ort he "grammar" of Prairie Houses, can be clearly expressed, and specific ways of exploring the space can be tried out. Methods for navigating, and changing, highly-structured spaces can be compared.
Of course, there is always the additional question of whether the suggested structures and processes are actually implemented in human heads. And that question isn'ta lways easy to answer.B ut the point, here, is that a computational approach givesu saw ay of coming up with scientific hypotheses about the rich subtleties of the human mind.
Computer Creativity?
What of the second link between machines and creativity? Can computers be creative?Orrather, can theyatleast appear to be creative?
Manyp eople would argue that no computer could possibly be genuinely creative, no matter what its performance was like. Even if it far surpassed the humdrum scientist or street-artist, it would not be counted as creative.I tm ight produce theories as ground-breaking as Einstein's, or music as highly valued as McCartney's" Ye sterday" or evenB eethoven'sN inth ... but still, for these people, it would'nt really be creative.
Several different arguments are commonly used in support of that conclusion. For instance: it's the programmer'screativity that'satw ork here, not the machine's. The machine isn'tconscious, and has no desires, preferences, or values --so it can'ta ppreciate or judge what it'sd oing. A work of art is an expression of human experience and/or a commmunication between human beings, so machines simply don'tcount.
Perhaps you accept at least one of those reasons for denying creativity to computers? Very well, I won'ta rgue with you here (but see Chapter 11 of Boden 2004). Let'sa ssume, for the purpose of this discussion, that computers can'tr eally be creative.T he important point is that this doesn't mean that there'snothing more of interest to say.
All the objections just listed accept, for the sakeo fa rgument, that the imaginary computer's performance is indeed very likethat of human beings, whether humdrum or not. What I want to focus on here is whether it'st rue that computers could, in fact, come up with ideas that at least appear to be creative.
Computer Combinations
Well, think of combinational creativity first. In one sense, this is easy to model on a computer. Forn othing is simpler than picking out twoi deas (twod ata-structures) and putting them alongside each other.T his can evenb ed one with some subtlety,u sing the (connectionist) methods described in Chapter 6. In short: a computer could merrily produce novelcombinations till Kingdom come.
But would theyb eo fa ny interest? Wes aw,a bove,t hat combining ideas creatively isn'tl ike shaking marbles in a bag. The marbles have tocome together because there is some intelligible, though previously unnoticed, link between them which we value because it is interesting --illuminating, thought-provoking, humorous ... --in some way.( Think sleep and knitting, again.) We saw also that combinational creativity typically requires a very rich store of knowledge, of manyd ifferent kinds, and the ability to form links of manyd ifferent types. (Here, think politicians and newts again.)
And we don'tonly form links, we evaluate them. For instance, we can recognize that a jokeis "in bad taste." In other words: yes, the links that the joker is suggesting are actually there (so it is ar eal joke). But there are other links there also, which connect the ideas with sorrow, humiliation, or tragedy.T he joker should have noticed them, and should have refrained from reminding us of them.
Forac omputer to makeas ubtle combinational joke, neverm ind to assess its tastefulness, would require (1) a data-base with a richness comparable to ours, and (2) methods of linkmaking (and link-evaluating) comparable in subtlety with ours. In principle, this isn'timpossible. After all, the human mind/brain doesn'tdoitbymagic. But don'thold your breath! The best example of computer-based combinational creativity so far is a program called JAPE, which makes punning jokes of a general type that'sfamiliar to every eight-year-old (see Chapter 12). But making a one-offjest is usually more demanding. Ask yourself, for instance, what Jane Austen had to knowinorder to write the opening sentence of Pride and Prejudice: "It is a truth universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife." (And why, exactly,isitfunny?)
Artificial Explorers and Self-Transforming Machines
What about exploratory creativity? Several programs already exist which can explore a given space in acceptable ways.
One example is AARON, a drawing-program described in Chapter 7. AARON can generate thousands of line-drawings in a certain style, pleasing enough to be spontaneously remarked upon by unsuspecting visitors --and to be exhibited in galleries worldwide, including the Tate. (The most recent version of AARON is able to paint its drawings, too: see Chapter 12.)
Another is David Cope's" Emmy," discussed in Chapter 12. This composes music in many different styles, reminiscent of specific human composers such as Bach, Vivaldi, Mozart ... and Stravinsky. Still others include architectural programs that design Palladian villas or Prairie Houses (also mentioned in Chapter 12), and programs that can analyse experimental data and find newways of expressing scientific laws (Chapter 8).
Af ew AI-programs can event ransform their conceptual space, by altering their own rules, so that interesting ideas result. Some of these ideas were already known to human beings, though not specifically prefigured within the program. (See the discussion of the automatic mathematician, AM, in Chapter 8.) But others are first-time-fresh. "Evolutionary" programs, for instance, can makerandom changes in their current rules so that newforms of structure result. At each generation, the "best" structures are selected, and used to breed the next generation.
Tw o examples that evolvec oloured images (some of which, likeA ARON's, are exhibited in galleries world-wide) are described in Chapter 12. In each case, the selection of the "fittest" at each generation is done by a human being, who picks out the most aesthetically pleasing patterns. In short, these are interactive graphics-environments, in which human and computer can cooperate in generating otherwise unimaginable images. These computer-generated images often cause the third, deepest, form of surprise --almost as if a coin being tossed repeatedly were suddenly to showa w holly unexpected design. In such cases, one can'ts ee the relation between the daughter-image and its parent. The one appears to be a radical transformation of the other,or ev ensomething entirely different.
Anyone who has watched TV regularly overt he past fewy ears, or who has visited museums of contemporary art, will already knowt hat manyn ovelg raphic images have been produced by self-transforming AI-programs of this kind. The problem is not to makethe transformations: that is relatively easy.W hat'sd ifficult is to state our aesthetic values clearly enough to enable the program itself to maket he evaluation at each generation. At present, the "natural selection" is done by a human being (for example, the gallery-visitor).
In more well-regulated domains, however, the value-criteria can often be stated clearly enough to allowthe evolutionary program to apply them automatically.Anearly example, a program for locating leaks in oil-pipelines, is mentioned in Chapter 8. Now, scientists are starting to use these techniques to enhance their own creativity.B iochemical laboratories in universities and pharmaceutical companies are using evolutionary programs to help design newmolecules for use in basic research and/or medicine. Even the "brains" and "bodies" of robots can nowbee volved, instead of being designed (see Chapter 12).
Values and Creativity
One huge problem here has no special relevance to computers, but bedevils discussion of human creativity too.
Is aid earlier that "new" has twom eanings, and that "surprising" has three. I didn'ts ay how manym eanings "valuable" has --and nobody could. Our aesthetic values are difficult to recognize, more difficult to put into words, and evenm ore difficult to state really clearly.( Fora computer model, of course, theyhav e to be stated really, really clearly.) Moreover, theyc hange: who will proudly admit, today,t oh aving worn a beehive hairdo or flared trousers in the 1960s? Theyv ary across cultures. And evenw ithin a given" culture," they are often disputed: different sub-cultures or peer groups value different types of dress, jewellery, or music. And where transformational creativity is concerned, the shock of the newm ay be so great theat evenfellow-artists find it difficult to see value in the novelidea.
Even in science, values are often elusive and sometimes changeable. Just what "simpliity" or "elegance" mean, as applied to scientific theories, is something that philosophers of science have long tried --and failed --to pin down precisely.And whether a scientific finding or hypothesis is "interesting" depends on the other theories current at the time, and on social questions too (might it have some medical value, for instance?).
Because creativity by definition involves not only novelty but value, and because values are highly variable, it follows that manya rguments about creativity are rooted in disagreements about value. This applies to human activities no less than to computer performance. So even if we could identify and program our aesthetic values, so as to enable the computer to inform and monitor its own activities accordingly,t here would still be disagreement about whether the computer even appeared to be creative.
The answer to our opening question, then, is that there are manyi ntriguing relations between creativity and computers. Computers can come up with newideas, and help people to do so. Both their failures and their successes help us think more clearly about our own creative powers. 
